Making Sense of Boko Haram

Since late October, the organization known as Boko Haram has enjoyed a “return to success” following a string of losses and the much hyped ceasefire negotiations with the Nigerian government. With the twin suicide bombings of two young girls in Maiduguri and the attack on Damasak on November 25, the organization’s terror is once again both making headlines and raising questions as to its motives and purposes.

Because the information on Boko Haram and its actions can be quite confusing at times, based on fear or greed fueled rumors, I will attempt to paint a concise and accurate picture of Boko Haram’s actual tendencies and strategies.

As I wrote in the latest edition of the German bi-monthly magazine Zenith, Boko Haram is not really about djihad, but about power. I also wrote that although it was for a very long time massively disorganized and lacked proper goals and structure, BH has shown since February 2014 a growing capacity for strategy, tactical evolution and organizational cohesion – the latter must not be confused with homogeneity, as Boko Haram is made up of various factions and anything but homogenic.

The evolution and the military success it translated to created a situation not unlike what we’ve seen with ISIS, namely unexpected swift progress, which lead to troops being overstretched, which in turn lead to logistical problems. And like ISIS, Boko Haram suffered setbacks, but the so-called lull in activities seen in September/October was more about catching their breath than actually being weakened. Hence the resurgence in activities over the last three to four weeks and the increasing confusion surrounding the situation in north-east Nigeria and Boko Haram.

Why does Boko Haram use girls as suicide bombers?

It is first and foremost a tactical choice. Women and children are seldom perceived as a threat and as such, provide the perfect cover for suicide bomber attacks. This does not constitute a novelty, as women suicide bombers have been used in various regions, including the Middle-East and Russia, an example being the Black Widows. But the regular use of girls – not women – since June as IED carriers has evolved into an M.O. for Boko Haram and this is the most frightening aspect of all. Such carriers are near impossible to detect and as the attack on Maiduguri proved, it can be extremely deadly if conducted precisely (the patience demonstrated by the second bomber is absolutely chilling).

Considering the number of girls kidnapped by Boko Haram over the years – not just the Chibok girls – means the organization has many “carriers” to choose from at its disposal. These victims are chosen for their “lesser value” as a wife, either because they suffer from disabilities or because they refuse to submit to their role or have been dishonored and must now be punished.

It is unlikely that BH’s use of female suicide bombers will come to an end soon, as it has proven both tactically effective while fostering justified disgust and fear. It is tragically the organization’s most efficient weapon.

What is the goal behind such attacks?

The goals have actually evolved from sending a message, testing tactics and spreading fear to becoming a diversion from other attacks. The latter began to emerge in June and July and really became a staple of Boko Haram’s operations this month with large scale bombings occurring on a weekly basis. The bombings are a diversion from the smaller scale attacks the organization has conducted on border towns with Cameroon and Chad and further south of their main area of operation. These raids have secured various supply and income routes, as well as strengthened forward operating positions and border areas. In short, while everybody is looking in the direction of the blast, Boko Haram is positioning its pieces with little to no opposition. This was again visible on November 25 in Maiduguri as it was with the attack on Gombe on November 5.

This strategy is what is securing BH’s “territorial expansion” and allowing it to make significant strategic and tactical gains, including recovering long-lost territory of the Kanem-Bornu empire, what Boko Haram leaders view as their emirate.

Wait. Isn’t Boko Haram about establishing a Caliphate under Shari’a in Nigeria?

One of the things the spreading of conflicts throughout MENA and the Sahel over the last five to six years has shown, is that the main insurgency groups are redrawing the regional map based on precolonial identities, both ethnic and tribal, while using former empires as their templates. ISIS is doing so with its “Islamic State” and Boko Haram is demonstrating tendencies to do the same using the Kanem-Bornu and Kanem empires as its inspiration.

As MOSECON’s Nik Wright states, it is the deep tribal and ethnic relationships – not Islam – that “enable recruitment and bind its members together in a collective pursuit through violent means”. This identity-based pursuit of power – the Kanuri tribe to which Shekau belongs was part of the Kanem-Borno empire – is what motivates Boko Haram, and this is something oft stated by the organization’s leaders. Indeed, again according to MOSECON’s Director of Operations, UK:

“Boko Haram leaders including Yusuf and Shekau have stated that the current colonial era political boundaries that cut off Niger and Chad and amalgamated Borno with the infidels should not be recognised. […] The collaboration of Muslims and in particular the Sokoto Caliphate with the colonial infidels created an impure version of Islam. In fact, Boko Haram attacking the city of Sokoto on a number of occasions is based on very symbolic reasons.”

As we can see, this goes beyond Nigeria and is in fact a regional problem that expands way into Libya and Sudan, across Niger and Chad. It is about restoring a “pure” precolonial status that was deemed lost with the emergence of the Sokoto Caliphate. It also helps explain – beyond business reasons – Boko Haram’s presence in these areas. This goal to restore the “Golden Age” is pivotal, because it bridges the Sunni/Shia divide and allows Boko Haram to work with unexpected partners.

Has Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State?

No it hasn’t, but it praised it and recognized its success in various propaganda videos. It’s fairly obvious negotiations as to “who gets what and how” are still ongoing. What is actually interesting is the various partnerships/collaborations Boko Haram has developed out of strategic and tactical purposes. Again as Nik Wright puts it:

“Despite the obvious ideological, theological and ethnological differences between the Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria, there is a synergy between the Shia (Islamic Movement of Nigeria, supported and heavily associated with Hezbollah) population and the Sunni (Boko Haram now associating itself with the Islamic State, having previously/presently also associated with AQIM, Al Shabaab and West African Islamic Jihads) community. Both groups believe that secular authorities should not hold power and that Northern Nigeria’s traditional Muslim leaders have allowed Muslim abuse to be perpetrated by the government. This albeit fragile and tenuous “collaboration” has created a muted stand off between both groups at the present time.”

This “stand-off” or distant collaboration is one borne out of circumstances and demonstrates just how far Boko Haram’s strategic inclinations have grown. The view is supra-regional, the goals mid- to long-term in comparison to the very shot-term planning seen in the past. This is truly an organization with a plan now.

As we can see, making sense of Boko Haram and what its actions entail is no easy task. But it is essential we do so, because this is no longer an organization simply bent on killing and creating chaos. It has outgrown its pillaging days and has evolved into using tactics that push long-term goals with the ruthlessness and savagery it has always been known for. Under these circumstances, tragedies like the attack in Maiduguri, and the smaller but highly important attacks on villages and towns will continue not only to take place, but increase in frequency as was the case this month.

It is imperative that the Nigerian government and security forces come to the same conclusions if Boko Haram’s success is to diminish and eventually to be subjugated. If the Nigerian security forces do not establish a long-term strategy which goes beyond reaction and actually gets ahead of the game, Boko Haram just may succeed in recreating its ideal empire.